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 Intertemporal Extraction of Mineral Resources
 under Variable Rate Taxes
 Robert F. Conrad and R. Bryce Hool
 1. INTRODUCTION
 In this paper we examine the effects of
 variable-rate taxes on intertemporal extrac-
 tion patterns and recovery from mineral de-
 posits. Such taxes are being applied with in-
 creasing frequency in the United States and
 other countries. However, as we demonstrate
 in the following analysis, their effects typi-
 cally go beyond those that have motivated
 their use. The formulation of mineral tax pol-
 icy should take into account the complete list
 of consequences.
 In practice there are currently three basic
 types of variable-rate taxes: time-dependent
 output taxes, price-dependent ad valorem
 taxes and progressive profits taxes. Per-unit
 output taxes which vary over time are applied
 in North Dakota and some of the Canadian
 provinces. Ad valorem taxes which vary with
 the market price of the mineral are used in
 Bolivia, Indonesia, and in parts of the United
 States such as Montana. Progressive income-
 related taxes have been introduced in Indone-
 sia and Ecuador.1 These variable taxes have
 been motivated by several objectives: (1) to
 acquire for the government a share of the
 windfall gains that are claimed to accrue to
 natural resource producers as a result of
 changes in the economic environment (prices
 or costs); (2) to capture the "economic" rent
 that would normally accrue to the owner of
 the reserves in a market economy;2 and (3) to
 preserve the real value of tax revenues. While
 there is some theoretical justification for ex-
 pecting the taxes to achieve these ends,3 there
 are also incentives created for altering the
 pattern of exploitation of the taxed resource.
 Most minerals are traded on unified world
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 markets, whereas taxes are imposed by "lo-
 cal" governments. So a tax imposed in a par-
 icular locality will change the spatial distribu-
 tion of relative prices of extraction and
 production, as well as change the economic
 environment within that locality.4 Further-
 more, characteristics of mineral deposits
 (such as ore quality, quantity, depth, accessi-
 bility) vary within and across deposits.5 Taxa-
 tion will therefore affect the magnitude of ec-
 onomically recoverable reserves, as opposed
 to geological reserves. Accordingly, the
 model that forms the basis of our analysis is of
 a price-taking firm engaged in extraction from
 a g ologically heterogeneous deposit.
 The model and some of its general proper-
 ties are described in section 2. In section 3 we
 demonstrate the consequences of each of the
 three types of variable-rate tax noted above.
 Section 4 contains a brief summary and dis-
 cussion of related issues.
 2. BASIC MODEL AND PROPERTIES
 In common with most models of the ex-
 tractive process, the optimal extraction path
 is taken here to be the solution to the dynamic
 allocation problem of maximizing the present
 value of the net cash flow generated by extrac-
 tion of the mineral resources.6 The distinctive
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 support from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy is
 gratefully acknowledged.
 'See Gillis (1978), Gillis and Beals (1980), Conrad
 and Hool (1980) and Stinson (1977) for details of these
 taxes.
 2See Hotelling (1931).
 3See Peterson (1976) and Burness (1976).
 4See McClure (1978).
 5See Thomas (1976) for detailed discussion.
 6See Peterson and Fisher (1977) for a review of this
 literature.
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 Land Economics
 feature of the model is the treatment of qual-
 ity variation. With the mineral deposit heter-
 ogeneous in quality, the optimal intertem-
 poral extraction profile specifies the quantity
 of each grade of ore to be extracted in each
 period. A brief description of the model fol-
 lows.7
 Grades of ore are indexed by g (g =
 1,.. .,G) in order of decreasing quality. If og
 is the proportion of metal in ore of grade g
 and Xtg is the quantity of ore of grade g ex-
 tracted in period t, then the total output of
 metal in period t is
 G
 agXg (t= 1,..., T)
 g=l
 where Tis the finite but arbitrary planning ho-
 rizon. The cost of extraction and processing in
 period t is taken to be a function of the aggre-
 gate throughput of ore, independent of qual-
 ity; i.e.,
 C,=C,(X,) t=l,...,T
 with C; > 0 and C' > 0, where
 G
 X, E Xtg.
 g=i
 Profit in period t is then
 t = 1, . . . T
 [1]
 where P, is the price of output (metal) in peri-
 od t. Given a discount rate of r, the firm's
 problem is therefore
 T
 MaxH= t
 {X,g} t= ( + r)t
 G G
 X P, agXtg- C, 2 xtg [2]
 g=-I g=l
 subject to the availability of reserves of each
 grade,
 T
 Rg Xtg g=1, ...G.. [3]
 t= I
 and non-negativity,
 Xtg=O t=l, ....T; g=1, ...G [4]
 The Lagrangian function for this problem is
 G L= n+ 2 (g Rg.
 g-l
 - X ig)
 where Xg (g = 1,. ..,G) is the shadow price of
 reserves of grade g. The optimal solution is
 characterized by the following Kuhn-Tucker
 conditions.
 For all (t,g):
 ag (1 + r)- [Pag- C,(X )]- Xg _O;
 X tg O; X 8L
 Ig
 [5]
 and for all g:
 _L T aL
 aa -= Rg - Xtg 0; Xg ; g = 0 [6]
 Of particular interest for the later analysis
 is the following characterization of the inter-
 temporal quality profile, implied by [5]. The
 timing of extraction of different ore grades
 corresponds to the time profile of discounted
 prices: extraction of the highest grade will oc-
 cur (until reserves are exhausted) in periods
 when the discounted price is highest; lower
 grades will be allocated sequentially in a like
 manner until further extraction is unprofit-
 able. More formally, if some of grade g (re-
 spectively, g') is extracted in period t (respec-
 tively, t') then
 (ag-a) Pt - , 0. g (l +' r ) t-I ( ag (I + r) 1 (1 + r)t'- = -
 so P p
 ag > ag, implies (+ ' -
 and 1 + r)'-' ( + r)'and
 [7]
 1 > , implies ag - ag,.
 (1 + r)t-1 (l + r)t-
 The ore quality g* at which extraction
 ceases to be profitable is referred to as the cut-
 off grade. Since the intertemporal ordering of
 extraction by quality does not necessarily cor-
 respond to the natural time sequence, this
 zero-profit margin (where marginal revenue
 equals marginal cost of ore extraction) may
 7See Conrad and Hool (1982) for more detailed de-
 velopment and proofs.
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 be reached at any time and does not generally
 imply a closing of the mine at that time. If the
 cut-off occurs in period k (ls<k< T) after some
 of grade g* has been extracted, then g* is
 characterized by
 Pk ag= CQ(Xk)
 i.e.,
 Ca (Xk )8]
 and
 T
 S Xtg* < Rg*.
 t=\
 According to the quality profile determina-
 tion described above, period k has the lowest
 discounted price of all periods in which there
 is some extraction. With the discrete quality
 variation assumed here, it may happen that
 extraction becomes unprofitable after re-
 serves of grade g* have been exhausted but
 before any of grade g* + 1 has been extracted,
 in which case
 Pkag* > Ck(Xk ) > Pkag*+ .
 In the subsequent discussion this boundary
 case can be ignored without affecting the es-
 sential implications of taxation for the cut-off
 grade and the implied total extraction and
 output from the mine.
 3. EFFECTS OF VARIABLE-RATE
 TAXATION
 The introduction of any sort of tax, other
 than a pure proportional profits tax, will in
 general alter the optimal extraction profile.
 The profile change will reflect three basic and
 interrelated effects. First, it is possible that
 the profile of effective (i.e., net-of-tax) out-
 put prices will be different, in which case the
 analogue under taxes of condition [7] will im-
 ply a different sequence of quality selection.
 Second, the reduction in effective prices may
 cause the zero-profit margin to be reached af-
 ter a smaller quantity of total extraction. The
 cut-off grade, characterized by the analogue
 of [8], may be higher as a result. Third, even if
 the quality ordering and cut-off grade are un-
 changed, the change in the relationship be-
 tween prices and costs will affect the optimal
 quantity of extraction in each period and thus
 the entire intertemporal profile.
 The precise effects of a discrete or mar-
 ginal change in a tax rate follow from the tax
 analogues of conditions [5] through [8]. For
 the marginal effects we can simplify the analy-
 sis, while bringing out clearly the allocative
 incentives, by determining the quantity re-
 sponses explicitly using a two-period, two-
 grade version of the model. In particular, we
 shall suppose that the higher grade of ore
 (grade 1) is extracted in both periods until re-
 serves are exhausted and that grade 2 is ex-
 tracted in the second period but not ex-
 h usted. (In the analysis below, this will be
 referred to as profile P.) It is implicit then,
 from the optimal grade selection characteri-
 zation given above, that the effective output
 price in period 1 is at least as high as the dis-
 counted effective price in period 2. The
 results for the reverse situation can be easily
 inferred. We shall also note the differences
 that would appear if reserves of grade 2 also
 are exhausted in period 2 (profile P'). To-
 gether these cases generate all the nontrivial
 reallocation incentives.
 3.1 Variable Per- Unit Severance Taxes
 This per-unit tax is set in nominal terms as
 a dollar amount per unit of output sold. The
 rate, Tt in period t, may vary from period to
 period.8 With a per-unit tax, the intertem-
 poral extraction problem, [2]-[4], is modified
by the substitution of P,-Tt for P, in [2] and
 correspondingly in [5], [7], and [8].
 The tax results in a general reduction in
 profitability of extraction. In particular, the
 cut-off grade, g*, will tend to be higher than
 g *, according to the counterpart of [8],
 Cki
 Pk - k
The timing of grade selection may also be
 affected by the introduction of (or discrete
 change in) this tax. Referring to the ordering
 condition [7], it will be the case that
 8For example, in North Dakota the Coal Severance
 Tax is tied to the Wholesale Price Index. See Link
 (1978).
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 Pt - Pt'
 (1+ r)'- (1 + r)'-
 implies
 Pt-T _ Pt t > 0
 (1+ r)t- ' (1 + r)t'-
 provided that
 Tt, Tt (1 + r)t
 If y is the (geometric) average growth rate (
 from t to t', [9] can be rewritten as
 (1 + y)'-'>= (1 + r)'
 so that [9] requires
 y _ r if t' > t
 and y - r if t' < t.
 Condition [9'] will be met if, in particular, t
 tax increases at the rate of interest.9 But ol
 erwise [9'] will not generally be satisfied an(
 is consequently plausible that the profile
 discounted net-of-tax prices, and hence t
 grade profile, will differ from the no-tax sitt
 tion.
 In general, the intertemporal extracti
 profile will be affected by a marginal chan
 in the sequence of tax rates. In a two-peri
 context, the change in taxes can be thought
 as being either a change in the base tax (
 with the growth rate (,y) unchanged, or v
 versa. In the former case, the relationship I
 tween the tax growth rate and the interest r<
 will appear again as a central factor in the
 termination of the quantity reallocation.
 discounted terms, a given increase in the i
 tial tax rate will lead to a larger or smaller
 crease in the future tax rate according
 whether or not the growth rate exceeds the
 terest rate. In addition to the general decli
 in profitability which results from a tax
 crease, there will be a tendency for interte
 poral reallocation to the period with the low
 discounted value of the increase. At the m
 gin the tax increase will tend to produce
 absolute reduction in quantity extract
 These two effects may or may not be reinfo
 ing.
 For a precise illustration of these gene
 effects, consider the initial extraction pro:
 described above. The corresponding nec
 sary conditions yield the quantity response
 axll aX21
 TI1 _ 2
 aT, Tia  [10.1]
 and
 aX22 X21 1- + Y2 [9] - T2- -~;(l+y)a2 ai1l OT! C  [10.2]
 Equation [10.2] represents the adjustment at
 the zero-profit margin; total extraction in pe-
 riod 2 (X21 + X22) must fall sufficiently that
 marginal cost is reduced by the amount of the
 effective tax increase on ore of grade 2. Equa-
 [9] tion [10.1] reveals the intertemporal adjust-
 ment. The first term in the square brackets
 the represents the pure reallocative effect (the
 th- sole effect in the absence of the second ore
 d it quality or in a situation like profile P') and
 of shows the dependence on the relative magni-
 the tudes of Y and r discussed above. The second
 aa- term is a consequence of the decline in total
 extraction in period 2 which, ceteris paribus,
 ion makes extraction of grade 1 more profitable
 ige in period 2 relative to period 1 at the margin,
 iod because of the reduction in marginal cost in
 t of period 2.
 Ti1) It is apparent from [10.1] and [10.2] that
 ice the net effect on the intertemporal profile de-
 be- pends on the grade distribution as well as the
 ate tax growth and interest rates. In particular,
 de- for profile P,
 axll >0
 aTi <
 as 1 +y> I (I +r)
 < a l- a2
 The presence of an economic margin with re-
 spect to reserves may therefore reverse the
 qualitative response. Note also that if the tax
 rate is not variable (-/=0) then, from [10.1]
 and [10.2], some of grade 1 is reallocated to
 the second period. In this case it is apparent
 from [10.2] that extraction of grade 2, and
 hence total recovery in the two periods, will
 decline. In general, however, when there is a
 9Severance taxes with this property have been dis-
 cussed by Peterson (1976) and Burness (1976), both of
 whom also assume that all ore is extracted.
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 reallocation of grade 1 from the second peri-
 od to the first it is quite possible for extraction
 of grade 2, and therefore total recovery, to in-
 crease.
 The effects of an increase in the tax growth
 rate, holding constant the initial tax rate, are
 more straightforward to determine since the
 onus of the tax is then unambiguously in-
 creased over time. Accordingly, there is a re-
 allocation from future to present. Again there
 is also a reduction in total second-period ex-
 traction to preserve the zero-profit margin.
 For profile P the quantity responses are
 ax11 ax21 1 T! _ - = ~ . + (a1 -a 2) [11.1]
 ay ay C" 1 + r
 and
 X22 _ X_1 - [11.2]
 a-y ay C'
 So extraction unambiguously rises in the first
 period and falls in the second, with the change
 in total recovery again ambiguous.
 It is worth emphasizing that, when either fy
 or T1 increases, extraction of grade 2 does not
 necessarily decline. The intertemporal reallo-
 cation changes the marginal cost structure
 and, furthermore, a given output tax implies a
 tax on ore that declines proportionately with
 the ore quality. The ultimate impact on total
 recovery therefore depends on both the grade
 distribution and cost structure. It should be
 emphasized that this conclusion is strictly ap-
 plicable only in the short run, since the inter-
 temporal pattern of capital investment and, a
 fortiori, the choice of technology are both
 taken as given.
 3.2 Variable Ad Valorem Severance Taxes
 An ad valorem severance tax is specified as
 a percentage of the market value of the out-
 put sold. For any given tax rate, the nominal
 value of the tax on a unit of output thus fluc-
 tuates with the market price. But also the rate
 itself, 3, in period t, may vary with the price.10
 The intertemporal extraction problem and
 optimality conditions are modified by the re-
 placement of P, by (1- B,)P, in [1], [2], [5], [7],
 and [8].
 As with tpe per-unit severance tax, the cut-
 off grade, go, with an ad valorem tax will tend
 to be higher than g*, since
 (-
 agra= (1 - fPk)Pk
 The order of grade selection may also
 change. Referring to [7] again,
 P, Pt,
 (1 + r)t- (1 +r)'
 implies
 (1 - t)Pt _( - #t,)Pt, 0
 (1 +r)' (1 (+ r)'
 if
 (1 + r)t-'
 A3Pt',
 [12]
 In terms of average rates of growth, if v and p
 are the respective growth rates for p1 and P,
 [12] becomes
 [(I + v)(I + p)]c'- (I + r)"-t
 which requires
 (l + v)(l + p) _ l + r if t' > t  [12']
 and
 (1 + v)(1 +p)_ I + r if t' < t.
 To a first approximation then, the order will
 be unaffected if
 v+p r if t'> t  [12"]
 and
 v +p - r if t'< t
 Unless the growth rate of the nominal value
 of the tax per unit of output (v + p) is equal to
 the rate of interest, condition [12"] will not
 generally be satisfied and, accordingly, the
 quality profile may be affected by the intro-
 'OThe New Mexico severance tax on uranium is an
 example. See Conrad and Hool (1980) for details.
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 duction of the tax. Stated in this form, the
 condition is seen to be equivalent to that in
 the preceding case of a per-unit tax, as would
 be expected.
 This correspondence between the per-unit
 and ad valorem taxes continues in the incen-
 tives for quantity reallocation. With the ap-
 propriate compounding of price and tax
 growth rates, and the inclusion of the price
 factor, the quantity responses are completely
 analogous. For profile P, the responses to a
 change in the initial tax rate, P31, are
 ax,, aX21




 ax22 aX2, 1
 a:=- 2- PI(l + v)(1 + p)a2 [13.2]
 Those for a change in the growth rate, v, of
 the tax rate are
 8X1_ ax21 I /l+p
 -r= C" PI PI(Cl e CO2) av = av IC' + r
 and
 aX22 _ aX21 ,
 =- v - C:' Pl(l + p) i la2
 The general conclusions regarding realloca-
 tion are thus the same in this case as for the
 per-unit tax. The adjustments depend on the
 grade distribution, the cost structure, and the
 real growth rate of the unit tax. Note that in
 the particular case where the tax rate is not
 variable (v=O), profile P requires p < r. It
 therefore follows from [13.1] and [13.2] that,
 as with the per-unit tax, grade 1 is extracted
 more slowly and total extraction declines.
 The implicit assumption that discounted
 prices are falling over time (profile P) is po-
 tentially important here. The fundamental
 distinction between the implications of ad va-
 lorem and per unit severance taxes is that a
 higher percentage tax, as with the ad va-
 lorem, translates into a larger absolute de-
 crease in effective price in the period that ini-
 tially has the higher effective price; whereas a
 higher nominal tax, as with the per unit,
 results in an effective decline that diminishes
 with time.
 3.3 Progressive Profits Taxes
 As noted above, a constant-rate profits tax
 will not create any incentive to distort the in-
 tertemporal extraction profile that is optimal
 in the absence of taxes. This is no longer the
 case when the tax rate itself is a function of the
 level of profits, as with a progressive tax.11
 Further, compared to the taxes already dis-
 cussed, the effects of the variable profits tax
 are more difficult to characterize because the
 tax on a unit of output or ore is not parametric
 to the firm. The rate is endogenous to the ex-
 tent that the firm determines its gross profit in
 any period and, in turn, the intertemporal
 path of profits does not stand in any simple re-
lationship to the path of output price or any
 other exogenous variable.
 The implications of these differences will
 be developed explicitly using a quadratic ap-
 proximation to the general tax function,
 namely
 T, = ntI, + 2 ,n,2
 where Tt denotes total taxes paid in period t
 and IIt is gross profit in period t, as defined in
 [1]. The Lagrangian function for the optimi-
 zation problem is then
 T
 L=-21 ( l+ ) + r)t- I 2 )
 G T
 + 2 -g Rg - Xtg
 g--- t=
 and accordingly, in the first-order conditions
 for an optimum,
 "Examples of progressive income-related taxes are
 the "windfall" profits tax on mineral extraction in Indo-
 nesia (see Gillis and Beals [1980]), the Net Proceeds Tax
 in Wisconsin (see Strasma [1975]), and the rent tax pro-
 posed by Garnaut and Ross (1975).
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 aL 1
 aXtg (1 + r)'-'
 x [(1 - Ir - I)( Pag - Ct'(Xt))] - Xg
 The zero marginal profit condition deter-
 mining the cut-off grade is unaffected by a
 profits tax. However, the same is not true of
 the condition characterizing the quality
 profile. With the profits tax, the counterpart
 of condition [7] is
 (1 - - ain,)P, (1 - - n,,),
 (ag-ag) (1 + r) (1 + r)'
 =0 [14]
 So in this case the rule for allocating grades in-
 tertemporally involves profits as well as dis-
 counted prices, since the effective price
 reflects the tax on profit. The rule is therefore
 no longer a function solely of exogenous vari-
 ables. How the time path of endogenous
 profits relates to the time path of prices de-
 pends, among other things, on the path of ex-
 traction costs. In particular, however, the
 gross profit may be higher when the dis-
 counted price is higher, in which case it is evi-
 dent from [14] that the introduction of a
 profits tax may alter the grade selection
 profile.
 The optimal extraction profile will respond
 to a change in the progressivity of the profits
 tax, i.e., in the parameter ,u. Moreover, there
 will also be a response to a change in the base
 tax rate, TI, which would not have been the
 case in the absence of progressivity (i.e.,
 when Ix is zero). The difference is due to the
 fact that, with a nonlinear tax, the firm does
 not allocate each grade so that the discounted
 value of its marginal profitability is equated
 across the time periods in which that grade is
 extracted. In broad terms, the optimal re-
 sponse to an increase in either of the tax pa-
 rameters will involve a reallocation away
 from periods with higher gross profits. How-
 ever, as shown in more detail below, the real-
 location of a higher grade will require some
 compensating adjustment in extraction of a
 lower grade. Whether total extraction will in-
 crease or decrease will be seen to depend on
 the path of profits prior to the tax change.
 For the representative profile P, the quan-
 tity responses to a change in -q are given by
 axll a IX21 = 1
 a - a - ( - -




 A=-[(l-N - HtIi)C' + x(Pa1 - C,)2]
 X [(1 - , - /I2) C2 + /(P2a2 ) ]
 is a positive determinant, and MIItg - Pg-
 Ct' denotes the marginal profitability in peri-
 od t of ore of grade g.
 Note first that total extractio  in period 2
 (X21 + X22) will remain the same, a conse-
 quence of the zero marginal profit condition
 for extraction of grade 2, which requires that
 the marginal cost of extraction in period 2 be
 unchanged. So whether or not the quantity of
 grade 2 extracted (and hence, total quantity
 extracted over the two periods) will be higher
 or lower as a result, depends on the direction
 of reallocation of grade 1. From [15] it is seen
 that this depends on the difference between
 the discounted marginal profitability of grade
 1 in the two periods. From the first-order con-




 for t = 1,2) it follows that
 MIIl - (1 + r) lMII21
 =(I +r)-'MrI21
 >0 as Ii 1 f12
 so
 axll >0
 an <  as 1I '11I2
 i.e., extraction of grade 1 is reallocated to-
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 ward the period with lower gross profit and
 total extraction rises or falls according to
 whether the cut-off grade (grade 2 here) is be-
 ing extracted in the period of higher or lower
 profit.
 The effects of an increase in the progressiv-
 ity of the tax are similar. For profile P the re-
 actions are given by
 ax,, aX21
 - - 1 (1 - -/H12)
 X Ct[IIi * Mll - II2(1 + r) MII21
 and
 ax22 aX21
 Reasoning analogous to that above shows
 HIi * MIIi, - 112(1 + r) IMI21 0
 as 1II I2
 so that again the reallocation of the higher
 grade is to the period with lower gross profit
 and extraction of the lower grade adjusts so
 that total quantity extracted in the cut-off pe-
 riod is constant. As was the case with an in-
 crease in the base rate of the profits tax, this
 may mean either an increase or decrease in
 total recovery from the deposit.
 4. SUMMARY
 It is evident from the preceding analysis
 that variability in tax rates, whether for out-
 put, value, or profits taxes, may create alloca-
 tion incentives that are qualitatively different
 from those under fixed-rate taxation. The dif-
 ferences appear in the order in which the vari-
 ous grades are extracted, the rate at which
 they are extracted, and the total quantity ex-
 tracted.
 In the case of per-unit severance taxes, a
 constant-rate tax induces a reallocation from
 present to future (when the discounted unit
 tax will be smaller) and a decline in total ex-
 traction. These effects are reversed if the tax
 rate is variable and has a sufficiently high
 growth rate (higher than the discount rate by
 an amount that depends on the grade distri-
 bution). The degree of intertemporal pro-
 gressivity of the tax may be critical also for the
 grade selection profile, but the outcome in
 any particular case depends on the path of
 output prices. A constant ad valorem sever-
 ance tax has no effect on grade selection but
 reallocates extraction in the direction of peri-
 ods with lower discounted prices and de-
 creases total recovery. In contrast, a variable-
 rate ad valorem tax may change the grade se-
 lection, alter the intertemporal profile in
 either direction, and increase total recovery.
 Finally, progressivity destroys the neutrality
 of a profits tax with respect to grade selection,
 extraction rate, and recovery, with distortions
 that depend qualitatively on the pre-existing
 path of profits.
 It must be emphasized that these conclu-
 sions are based on an analysis that is short run
 in the sense that there is no scope for an in-
 vestment response to diminished profitabil-
 ity. This applies particularly to the conclusion
 that total extraction may be higher under
 more progr ssive taxes. In the longer run,
 smaller pro its will discourage investment in
 the taxing jurisdiction and result in lower re-
covery from the deposits. Quite aside from
 this, however, it is clear that the implications
 of variable-rate taxation are sensitive to both
 geological and economic conditions. Unless
 these conditions are accounted for in the for-
 mulation of tax policy, none of the usual taxes
 can be relied upon to produce the desired
 results in terms of tax revenue or conserva-
 tion of the resource.
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